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INTRODUCTION 
 
If you don’t turn your life into a story, you just become part of 
someone else’s story  
—Terry Pratchett 
 
When I think of being ill, my mind still, instinctively, draws forth an 
image of bed and warmth: my mother’s cool hand pressing against 
my warm forehead, a sense of sleepiness overlaying a burning throat 
and aching muscles. This is probably the first memory I have of 
‘being ill’, and yet it is not the symptoms I recall clearly, but the 
bedclothes and my mother. I most firmly remember that it was okay 
to be ill, it’s okay, you’re going to be fine, it’s okay. It is reasonable to 
assume that a lot of people have similar first experiences and 
memories of illness as a child, that they also bring forth such images 
when thinking of illness. It is odd for me, because for the last nine 
years I have lived with an undiagnosed chronic illness- a seizure 
disorder without name, and without medical validation. When I 
think of having a disease, that is when I am seized (aptly) by images 
of convulsing limbs and twisting muscles, of a tableau of emotions so 
strong my mind naturally shies away from it. I think of doctors 
visits and medical tests, of blood and questions. I think of doubt, in 
myself, in my doctors faces, in my reality. I feel ill when I have a 
seizure. I feel ill after I have a seizure, and sometimes even before. I 
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have acute and irrefutable symptoms; a seizure is harder to disguise 
than cancer. But I do not have a ‘disease’ or an ‘illness’ in the 
medical sense, and this means I am often forced to forfeit it in the 
social.  
 
One does not have to fight to explain a named or diagnosed illness, 
but will inevitably have to fight stigmas, prejudices, assumptions 
and discriminations. People living with an undiagnosed chronic 
illness experience this differently; as Joseph Dumit put it, it is 
‘illness you have to fight to get’ (Dumit 2006). Fighting intimately 
implies conflict, and conflict lies at the heart of constructing my 
condition. In the four major spheres of my life – work, relationships, 
medicine, and university – I construct my illness differently, and am 
afforded different recognitions and validations. I have used these 
spheres as the topics of each chapter. Each speaks of the social 
construction of a condition, told through rich, descriptive text, 
composite accounts of lived experiences, creative and visual auto 
ethnographic methods, and theoretical analysis. 
 
There are so many questions to be asked about illness, disease, 
disability, and society. What do these words mean, and why do they 
mean so many different things to so many people, cultures, and 
societies? What is the role of illness in everyday life? How much of it 
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should be mediated through medical lenses? Through cultural ones, 
or personal? Why do we struggle to reconcile the experience of 
illness with living a moral life? Many a brilliant writer or researcher 
has posed these questions, and more. But of interest to me is how 
the day-to-day experience of the chronically ill is routinely defined 
by stigma, by otherness, by a fractured and immoral life. I have had 
the interesting fortune of experiencing a chronic, undiagnosed 
illness, one that started in my late teens and has framed most of my 
life since then. In choosing to document it for my honours thesis, I 
was influenced by two factors. First, a desire to understand my own 
existence in a more active sociological sense, and secondly, to explore 
why the world positions illness as so removed from a ‘normal’ life, 
when our medical, technological, social and cultural progressions 
clearly indicate differentness is in fact the ‘norm’. Is it merely a 
bone-deep and atavistic fear of death? A lesson taught to us socially 
by a culture obsessed with progression of the human state? 
Answering these questions is not the goal so much as the driving 
force: I instead intend to explore how illness construction is 
mediated by different spaces.  
 
Important to the structure of this thesis is the construct of my sense 
of self. I exist in a liminal space between disability and illness, 
belonging to neither, and often relegated to the status of a healthy 
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person. It is in this liminality that the spirit of my analysis can be 
found. To be ill, to be forever presently sick, is a burden in our 
current world. We can best appreciate liminality through Victor 
Turner’s (1970) description:  
The attributes of liminality, or of liminal personae (“threshold 
people”) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and 
these people elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states or positions in 
cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; 
they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and 
arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial (Turner 
1970:95). 
 
Betwixt and between we are, and therefore difficult to theoretically 
analyse. How best to capture the illness experience without 
sacrificing the true meaning of living it? The very first question was 
to reconcile what other subject must be analysed in hand with 
illness: namely, the body. Is the body just a container for the self? 
Cultural dialogue would certainly suggest so. We view our bodies as 
separate, as an Other, a thing with limits and borders which hold us 
apart from the world. The dialogue of illness expresses this 
conceptualisation perfectly, when we describe stroke patients as 
trapped inside their bodies, when we say illness changes a person, or 
that one suffers from illness. Unspoken is that illness—and chronic 
illness specifically—often ‘includes metaphor and meaning, moral 
judgments and ethical dilemmas, identity questions and 
reconstruction of self, daily struggles and persistent troubles’ 
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(Charmaz 2000:277). The body is not just a container for the self, but 
it is the vessel through which we connect with the world, how we 
protect ourselves, and holds our identity as a stable construct. In 
illness, ‘the self has become vulnerable, and thus problematic 
(Charmaz 2000:277). My self-construction is wrapped around my 
illness, and my illness is undefined and fragile. 
 
One thing became apparent as I dug deeper into the research for 
this thesis: that every single experience I had of illness had been 
referenced and dissected by dozens of other writers. My doing away 
with heels and difficult clothing? Kelleher 1988. My struggle with 
organising my illness into experiences shared with others so doctors 
might listen to me? Dumit 1997. The annoyance from those same 
doctors as I commandeered their power? Charmaz 2005. Stigma in 
the workplace, relationship breakdown, feelings of alienation, 
exclusion from social contacts? Bury, Conrad, Nettleton, Pinder, 
Pierret, Little- the list was endless. I became uncertain that I had 
anything to add to the discussion, until I started reading Arthur 
Frank’s body of work.  
 
Before the preface of his book ‘Letting Stories Breathe’, Frank 
selected a short quote from a mythological-historical story by Barry 
Unsworth: ‘We are all the victims of stories in one way or another, 
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even if we are not in them, even if we are not born yet’. Iphigenia, 
daughter of King Agamemnon, is the speaker, and it is hard to think 
of a person who more embodies that idea than she. Those who know 
the myth would know her death was decided upon before she was 
even born, that she is relegated to a footnote in the history of Greek 
mythology. It is a poignant thought to begin any narrative, 
especially for the sociologist who sees how much of an individual life 
is controlled by the society to which they are born. We are all the 
victims of stories. The chronically ill, in literature and culture, are 
so often reduced to victim narratives, or to subjects in medical 
studies, or the respondents of a sociological survey. We are the 
many, nameless, objects around which other people write their 
stories, but our stories do not end when their narrative does or in 
the conclusion of the study. The most disappointing eulogy is the one 
that reduces the entire story of a person to some sad summary of 
their illness. I wanted to speak out through my story to provide 
research and analysis into lived experiences of chronic illness, and 
chose the method of autoethnography, and illness narratives to do 
so. 
 
Autoethnography as a method for sociological research occupies a 
tense threshold between groups affording it different definitions. 
The competing forms of autoethnography would (and indeed have) 
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require a whole book to describe, so I am settling for offering an 
explanation of the form I chose to utilise –analytic autoethnography, 
so coined by Leon Anderson (2006). Broadly, autoethnography can 
be defined as ‘‘research, writing, story, and method that connect the 
autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and political’’ 
(Ellis 2004:xix). It is, however, Anderson’s (2006) call for 
‘distinctively grounded opportunities to pursue the connections 
between biography and social structure that are central to C. Wright 
Mills’s conception of the sociological imagination’ that drew me to 
the method (390). Anderson sets the parameters of analytic 
autoethnography within three rules: ‘ethnographic work in which 
the researcher is (1) a full member in the research group or setting, 
(2) visible as such a member in the researcher’s published texts, and 
(3) committed to an analytic research agenda focused on improving 
theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena’ (375). I 
fulfil the first, am presenting as the second, and am committed to 
the third. It is the third point to which I now turn my attention, to 
discuss the theoretical concerns I use to analyse chronic illness, as 
well as my justification for studying my own narrative. 
Autoethnography has detractors the same as any method, raising 
many legitimate concerns. Sara Delamont (2006), Paul Atkinson 
(1997), and more have written extensively on the inclination of 
autoethnography to generate self-indulgent or lazy research useful 
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to only a privileged few. This is entirely possible, but it also ignores 
the potential to create research that delves deeper and produces 
stronger knowledges of under-privileged areas. I see the need for the 
author in the text. When Gatson writes of her experience of being 
biracial, she highlights the need for the subject to speak out in the 
text by offering a subjective opinion not easily accessible for those 
‘outside’ her own self: ‘As I both research racial and ethnic 
definitions comparatively and historically as well as move myself 
about the world, I find a less definite, yet more connected, identity’ 
(2003:21). Gatson tells her reader, and sociology at large, more about 
the complex experience of bi-raciality in one paper than a dozen 
formal participant-observation ethnographies ever could. Analytic 
autoethnography tied with illness narratives (as defined by both 
Charmaz 2000 and Kleinman and Seeman 2000) provide a similar 
outcome.  
 
In hand in hand with analytic autoethnography are the key concepts 
for this thesis- Michael Bury’s (1982) biographical disruption, Miles 
Little’s (1998) liminality, and Arthur Frank’s (2004) sociology of 
witness, or call for storytelling. Bury’s concept needs little 
introduction, given its seminal status in the study of chronic illness. 
It is from Bury’s ‘disruptive event’ that I draw my focus: my seizures 
are the epicentre of my disrupted biography, but how do I –or 
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anyone afflicted with a disruptive illness– construct a ‘stable’ reality 
around them? Furthering this, Miles Little (1998) conceptualises the 
lived experience of illness as a category called ‘liminality’, which 
incorporates a process ‘in which each patient constructs and 
reconstructs meaning for their experience by means of narrative’ 
(1485). It is Little’s inclusion of narrative analysis that leads us to 
Arthur Frank’s call for ‘wounded storytellers’ (2013).  
 
It is as the wounded storyteller I write this thesis. Often I am 
hurting: these words were written not just at desks, or on lawns, but 
in beds and the many waiting rooms of medical professionals. My 
world before committing these words to paper seemed as Arthur 
Frank describes the chaos narrative:  
‘those living in chaos are least able to tell a story because they 
lack any sense of a viable future. Life is reduced to a series of 
present-tense assaults. If a narrative involves temporal 
progression, chaos is anti-narrative’ (2013:xv).  
 
Stringing together disparate threads of experience feels like 
searching for meaning in a kaleidoscope: the interconnectedness of 
the parts is apparent, but there is no big picture. I do not disagree 
with Frank’s (2013) assertion, on the topic of narratives, that ‘to 
turn the chaos into a verbal story is to have some reflective grasp of 
it’ (98). Yet chaos is inherent to my narrative, and writing it out had 
not diminished that. I try to weave it into words, but it is like 
clutching at grains of sand: the harder I try, the faster they fall. I 
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focus on the least chaotic elements, and my story becomes a 
summary in no way reflective of my lived experience. To balance 
this, I include thematic vignettes, experimental writing sections, 
and my own informal speaking tone. I do this to convey a living 
sense of the ‘me’ in my story; where I fall shy of deeper analysis is 
where I am physically incapable of reflection, as ‘the story traces the 
edges of a wound that can only be told around’ (Frank 2013:98, my 
emphasis). 
 
Being able to capture the past in any linear sense is difficult for 
persons with chronic illness. Events of acute and non-acute episodes 
bracket the recollection of life history, and the world seems as if 
wholly composed of immediate pain. If chronic illness unfolds as 
Michael Bury (1982) suggests, ‘first, there is the disruption of taken-
for-granted assumptions and behaviours; the breaching of common-
sense boundaries’ (169). The next is crucial to even an outsider 
understanding of chronic illness: chronic illness ‘involves a 
recognition of pain and suffering, possibly even death, which are 
normally only seen as distant possibilities or the plight of others’ 
(Bury 1982:169). Constructing a linear autoethnography was 
therefore impossible, but the potential of recounting specific 
events—as done by Huang Zhenji in Kleinman and Kleinman 
(1994)—seemed possible. It is this illness narrative aspect that I 
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found pivotal to this research. Worrying that I would lack distance 
and self-reflexivity to produce meaningful research, I thought of 
Oliver Sacks’ words: how could one know that one had shrunk if 
one’s frame of reference had shrunk?’ (2012:156). Could I know who 
I was enough to write of illness experience if I struggled with time 
and boundaries? Was it true when people told me ‘aren’t you brave’, 
like there is something active about my approach to illness? Like 
somehow I’ve chosen this existence, instead of simply reacting 
constantly to each day? If I think there is no action in my actions, 
only reaction and response, can I honestly produce anything 
worthwhile? Such doubts, however, are very much important for the 
wounded storyteller. We are working from a place less stable, a 
place defined by its reduced bonds. It is in this place that our stories 
become critical, that they become ‘about recognising how much we 
as fellow-humans have to do with each other’ (Frank 2013:163).  
 
To begin this thesis, I outlined my main researcher question (how do 
I construct my illness?) and separated it into four broad areas that 
define my life: work, relationships, medicine, and university. While 
there are thematic overlaps in some of these categories (work and 
university had the potential to be identical), I soon realised the 
construction work I do in each area differs to degrees of which I had 
not been consciously aware. In ‘Medicine’ I analyse power 
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relationships in the medical world, using my own experience to 
explore the basis of illness construction as socially—and not 
biologically—framed. In my chapter ‘Work’, I dissect power and 
culturally normative responses to illness. I consider how my illness 
frames my working identity and ability, and how the failing morality 
of the ill body is shunned, contained, or hidden in the workplace. 
‘University’ covers the role of knowledge in illness production, the 
lived experience of pain and medication, and the emergence of my ill 
identity acceptance.  In ‘Relationships’, I question the right to the ill 
experience, and analyse how others respond to my illness, and why 
holding ones self apart is problematic. For all of these chapters, I 
contend that ‘illness is not simply present in nature, waiting to be 
discovered by scientists or physicians’, but an evolving and fluid 
experience that stretches from body to body, in and out of social 
organisations and frameworks (Conrad and Barker 2010:S68). 
 
I want to convey not only the sociological implications of chronic 
illness, but also the lived experience, and this autoethnographic 
illness narrative gives me the freedom to do both. If we accept that 
female writers are needed for insight into the female perspective, as 
we do with feminist literature, or that the inclusion of ethnic writers 
will dismantle the ‘white’ hegemony of sociology, then I believe we 
need writers from inside the chronic illness experience to usefully 
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engage with theories, and develop a better sociology of health and 
illness. One way to engage this process is the use of storytelling, a 
concept espoused by Frank (2013) as being ‘a sociology of witness’ 
(24). The story of the ill person is that ‘they seek not to provide a 
map that can guide others –each must create his own– but rather to 
witness the experience of reconstructing one’s own map’ (Frank 
2013:17). I need not to impress or sadden, to elicit empathy or pity 
with my personal story, but rather to call forth connections between 
myself and others.  
 
When I have a seizure, I am alone. It is only me who knows the 
strange, hollow ache in my left arm, who slides towards the floor and 
feels my muscles becoming stiff, unresponsive and painful; only I 
know the alienating sensation of watching and feeling my body 
contracting and convulsing without my control. Only I know the 
exquisite pain deep in my bones when I go limp. Yet, I am never 
alone in my illness. Others see me in these states: doctors and 
nurses, my mother and father, my family, my friends, co-workers 
and complete strangers. They too carry stories of my illness, bear 
the weight of it, and share in the inexorable change of life with a 
chronic illness. This thesis is my story, but it is made up of their 
stories too. This is the role and responsibility of the wounded 
storyteller: to be trusted with, and trust in, the stories with which 
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we construct our lives; to find the many meanings and grant them a 
voice. 
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CHAPTER ONE: MEDICINE 
 
 
What then does one seek? Not a hidden power, but a source of 
kinship for mature persons. And also the assurance that it is not 
totally absurd to have suffered. 
—Emmanuel Levinas ‘Is it righteous to be?’  
 
 
 
 
This chair is uncomfortable. It is my first thought as I settle into the 
room the nurse has led me. I shift and twist, give up. Standing, I 
look around at the faded walls, the usual array of medical posters, 
and trays of medical supplies. I wonder briefly if I could have use for 
a handful of whatever those plastic-wrapped tubes are. Probably 
not, but I am irritated by the multiple delays this morning. Three 
and a half hours drive, two more in the waiting room, and now a 
cheery ‘the doctor will be just a moment’. A ten-minute moment, so 
far, and the impulse to filch random things is my poor attempt at 
empowering my position. I console myself by flicking all the 
pamphlets out of order, pause, and re-tidy them. My stomach is 
twisted up, and my hands are shaking slightly. 
The door opens, startling me. The doctor- who will soon tell me these 
are all indicative of his diagnosis- is a tall, smiling man who I have 
met three times before. A neuro-psychiatrist, he has a kind 
expression, and makes me feel at ease. At least, until he informs me 
I am not suffering from an undiagnosed seizure condition.            
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“It’s purely psychological. We didn’t find any evidence of a biological 
basis.” 
“But I was told you didn't find any evidence of a psychological basis, 
either? And the neurologist here said I was definitely having 
seizures.” 
“Well, our final group decision is that it’s in your head. It’s a good 
thing- epilepsy or any chronic illness is a terrible thing to live with.” 
I’m quite shocked. Weeks of back and forth tests, driving interstate, 
being strapped into beds and wires and headgear, a reiteration of 
the last 7 years of my hometown medical induction, and… what? All 
leading to a dismissal even my long-term doctors never reached.  
For some reason, I fixate on one point.  
“I have disability status at uni.” 
“Cancel it. You need to get on with it. You’ll probably never have 
another little turn again.” 
I am convinced I must be angry, but I can’t access my emotions.  
I wonder if this man has read my medical file. I have 7 years of 
seizures to prove him wrong. But I can’t form an intelligent reply. I 
am suddenly incapable of arguing my defence. I sit and agree, nod 
along, anxious to escape this room. I am consciously aware that I’m 
playing the role of the patient, to my own detriment. It does not 
matter what I know. Doctor knows best. He’s seen a hundred girls 
like me- girls, a slip of the tongue, or were all the patients female? Is 
	 20	
that why I’m effectively been given a modern day diagnosis of 
hysteria? He basically confirms it: I don’t have the usual trauma 
background for a psychosomatic illness; it must be my disposition. 
Never mind that the five previous psychiatrists and psychologists 
have said I am intelligent and well adjusted. There’s no biological 
evidence, I must be crazy.  
I stand, and I’m nauseous and shaking. I don’t let him see. It is very 
important that he sees me, this last time, as calm and accepting. I 
want to yell at him, but I am firmly behind my wall of icy politeness. 
 
Medicine Analysis 
 
Issues of identity, authenticity, and conflict frame my relationship 
with the medical world. I am, as Michael Bury (1982) theorised, 
caught in a ‘disruptive experience’ of cultural frameworks that allow 
limited or no recognition of the effects of chronic illness (p.169). My 
status is further complicated by my lack of diagnosis. Doctors 
regularly see me as unusual but not critical; I am allowed a certain 
percentage of medical time, but without the essential commitment of 
future. Sometimes I am dismissed outright, sometimes humoured, 
rarely authenticated by attention or action. My experience in the 
medical community is hardly unique- the patients in Bury’s 
rheumatoid arthritis study, Sarah Nettleton’s Medically 
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Undiagnosed Symptoms, Little’s cancer patients, and more, all 
describe a sort of alienation between patient and doctor. As White 
(2009) indicates, our medical profession is designed not to cure 
illness, but as ‘the social control function…in enforcing compliance 
with social roles in modern society’ (6). This results in a certain 
problem of expectation between doctor and patient. We, as patients, 
implicitly assume the doctor can, if not cure us, at least 
contextualise our ill self. When we fit into a recognisable category of 
medicine, the doctor can prescribe both treatment and our social 
role. When we do not, it is a failing of two kinds: no medical 
treatment, no social role.  
 
These failings are best expressed through the approach of Little et al 
(1998), for it is the ‘adaptive, enduring phase of suspended 
liminality’ in which the undiagnosed chronic illness experience is 
located (1485). My illness lives in a liminal space, easily apparent in 
a physical sense, yet hidden from conventional medical testing. 
When I have a seizure -and my use of the term is controversial in 
the strictest definition- I fall to the ground, my muscles contract and 
stiffen, my cognitive function lessens, I am without control of my 
own body. Yet, monitoring from MRI, CAT-scan, EEG, EKG, etc., 
indicates no discernible aberration. According to these tests, I have 
no illness. According to the hundreds of seizures I have had, I clearly 
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have a illness. A lack of diagnosis extends much further than the 
doctor’s office, it permeates every space of my life, leaving me 
‘neither here nor there’ (Turner 1970:95). The space I cannot enter, 
that of authenticity, is the one I most need to occupy in order to 
facilitate my cultural positioning. My lack of diagnosis is not a rare 
occurrence- in one UK study, 51% of new patients were identified as 
having ‘medically unexplained symptoms’, and of the neurology 
patients, 27% of those presenting with seizures were considered to 
have this same lack (Reid et al 2000). In Australia, up to one in four 
primary care patients experience these symptoms (‘Health Report’ 
2012). Over time, my illness has been referred to as ‘atypical seizure 
disorder’, ‘tonic-clonic seizure-like activity’, ‘undiagnosed muscle 
spasms’ and ‘myoclonus’, a descriptive, symptomatic term. I usually 
describe it as a seizure disorder, for ease of understanding, and to 
lessen questioning responses. In a medical context, I cling to 
myoclonus, as it is a recognisable term. But it is also in response to 
the diagnostic uncertainty of waiting to find a disease with which to 
label my symptoms (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). 
Uncertainty is the key to this diagnostic wait, and while Turner 
(1990) points this out as ‘compliance in the sick role’ (201), 
Timmermans and Buchbinder (2010) stress the long-term impact 
this has on the patient. Terming us ‘patients-in-waiting’, the authors 
offer a succinct explanation for my liminal state: without diagnosis, 
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where a ‘cognitive schema that offers a plan of action for both 
patient and clinician’ is lacking, there develops a ‘pressure to fold an 
incomplete characterisation back into more conventional categories’ 
(409/410). We—as patient, clinician, or other—crave categorisation 
and label. 
 
The reality of living with an undiagnosed illness repositions the 
medical world as a daily construct in my life. I have medicalised 
routines of medicine-taking and pathological monitoring. I record 
bodily symptoms and events across an array of technological devices. 
My calendar is littered with appointments and follow-ups with 
medical professionals. I debate and defend my treatment plan with 
personal friends and professionals alike. I check online sources and 
consult medical dictionaries for information. I keep folders of 
documentation on my bookshelves, propped up by decorative 
bookends. Medicine and my body are visible to me in ways I would 
not recognise if I were healthy. Yet for all the medicalisation of my 
daily life, I am ‘outside’ the medical realm, looking in. The impact of 
this is two-fold: I am not authentically ill, yet I am ill, and thus my 
identity is fractured. Sarah Nettleton (2006) suggests my experience 
is ‘emblematic of’ contemporary society, hallmarks of ‘a demise of 
social classification and social categories, and a concurrent rise in 
perpetual insecurity, risk and anxiety’, making my identity struggle 
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the outcome of a skewered power imbalance between medicine and 
the individual (1167).  
 
Constructing my illness in a medical space becomes a high-stakes 
negotiation between myself, my doctor, and the medicalised world. I 
am expected, as the patient, to act uncertain, as ‘an essential 
component of patient compliance in the sick role’, to remain ignorant 
in the face of the doctor’s knowledge (Turner 1990:201). The doctor 
in turn must imbue confidence in me, fulfilling his role as 
gatekeeper to protected knowledge, and authentication of a social 
state. Yet it is crucial to note that the chronic illness sufferer is not 
afforded the luxury of remaining ignorant nor uncertain. In order to 
manage the day to day of our lives, we must take up an active state 
of being in both medical and non-medical spaces. This puts us in 
conflict with medicalisation, as Charmaz notes, ‘People with chronic 
illness can and do become knowledgeable about their conditions; 
these individuals are not always the unsophisticated passive 
patients the medical model assumes’ (2000:288). We fight constantly 
to know more about our illness, to better construct our lives, but are 
frequently forced back into passive roles.  
 
In my vignette, I focus on this imbalance of power in doctor-patient 
interactions, and the role of authoritative validation. That moment 
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remains a defining one in my conceptualisation of the medical 
community, because it highlights the underlying issue of being 
undiagnosed in a world regulated by labels, names, and positions. I 
am at all times proving myself ill to the medical world, and from the 
medical world. I turn myself again and again to the medical world in 
an effort to legitimise my experience, an act that Gareth Williams 
correctly asserts will ‘assault an individual’s sense of identity’ 
(1984:175). Identity frameworks are reinterpreted as belonging to 
medical value systems. The naming of illness ‘allows an opportunity 
to conceptualise disease as separate from self’ (Bury 1982:172).  
 
Do I even want to be labelled ‘ill’? Ann, the subject of Ron Iphofen’s 
‘Coping with a perforated life’ (1990) speaks of her reaction to 
diagnosis, ‘I would now never be free from the fear of being 
powerlessly subjected to a violent public exhibition’ (456). The 
pathologisation of life problems is in itself a cage. The problem is, 
when I respond with dismay or anger towards the medical world 
refusing to legitimate me, I am not expressing a desire to have a 
disease (as the psychosomatic model would suggest). What I am 
doing is ceding to social forces that insist that my irregularities are 
only valid if they are medicalised. Take for example our 
understanding of public speaking. My inability to talk confidently in 
large groups is no longer ‘social reticence…(that is) typically 
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considered characterological…part of the normal range of human 
personality’, but a medicalised problem named ‘social anxiety 
disorder (Conrad 2007:150). It is not natural, it is pathological. My 
seizures and other abnormalities are not ‘natural’ parts of my 
physiology, but without biological basis, they are problematic. The 
medical world would rather they (and I) went away, because they sit 
outside of our cultural and social understandings of pathological 
models. This view is echoed by other sufferers of chronic illness, in 
Nettleton’s ‘Understanding the narratives of people who live with 
medically unexplained illness’ (2005), respondents spoke of ‘…the 
implication I got from one doctor was that there was no problem’ and 
‘what I can’t accept is them saying, ‘look we don’t know what it is, go 
away and leave us alone and stop bothering us’’ (207/208). These 
narratives could be the template for most interactions MUS 
sufferers have with doctors. Opposing this paradigm are a few 
doctors intent on providing treatment, or at least being 
understanding, to the undiagnosed in their care. Considering the 
negative effects of liminality, Louise Stone offers ‘strategies for the 
management of medically unexplained symptoms, including the 
importance of an empathetic therapeutic relationship’ (2014:192). 
Included in her suggestions are: 
 
•‘Validating the patient’s experience by acknowledging that the 
symptoms are real and distressing. It is also important to 
validate the frustration and uncertainty experienced when 
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there is no concrete diagnosis. 
•Offering a detailed biopyschosocial explanation of symptoms 
using language and imagery that the patient understands. 
•Naming the illness appropriately. This may involve diagnostic 
terms, or explanatory metaphors. 
(Stone 2014: Table 1. Managing the patient with medically 
unexplained symptoms)  
 
Such an approach offers a bridge towards a more ideal patient-
doctor relationship, but there is little spread or acknowledgment of 
such thinking in the broader medical community. Additionally, this 
strategy lacks solutions for social legitimacy, including welfare or 
workplace support, and interpersonal relationship management. 
While we continue to live in a society that privileges medical 
knowledge, we need these aspects of the illness experience to be 
acknowledged. Medicalisation is best seen as a form of social power- 
we privilege its knowledge due to ‘the alliance between hospitals, 
universities and the medical profession’ (Turner 1990:157). As we 
are trained to defer to the judgements of these groups, we are asked 
to assume the knowledge imparted is empirical. To question this, or 
or in Conrad’s (1992) words, to ’emphasise the darker side’ means 
the ‘assumption of medical moral neutrality, domination by experts, 
individualisation of social problems’ (223) is flawed, uncritical and 
dangerous, or as Nettleton (2006) puts it, proof of the ‘postmodern 
world bracing itself for life under a condition of uncertainty which is 
permanent and irreducible’ (1169). We, in the micro sense, cling 
uncritically to the knowledge of the medical world to prevent chaos 
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in ourselves; dismissal from this world thus necessarily invites chaos 
into us. There is some suggestion of challenge to the hegemony of 
biomedical knowledge (Kelly and Field 1998, Williams 2000, 2003), 
particularly in the rise of complementary medicine used by chronic 
illness sufferers (Thorpe 2009), reiterating Nettleton’s (2006) stance 
on the postmodern state of uncertainty. While these links are 
undoubtable, the power of ‘the biomedical system, despite 
acknowledgement of its flaws, (is) seen as a source of relative 
certainty amidst the uncertainties’ (Thorpe 2009:387). Continually 
medical spaces and power are the centre against which to construct 
the illness experience.  
 
In a way, my dismissal of the physician’s ‘diagnosis’ was validated 
by, and negotiated through, my knowledge of sociological theories of 
illness. This knowledge elicited a response that spoke to a core belief 
in my illness (that I have an illness), and my tendency to 
‘differentiate’ as a valid person who also happens to have an illness 
(Clair et al 2005:83). My thought process and conceptual 
understanding of the medical world still renders me an inarticulate 
patient because the model requires compliancy pre-diagnosis. 
Articulating a differentiation challenges the systemic prejudice that 
would constrict the ‘patient’ to a homogenous template. Crucially, 
‘the great danger here is that transforming all difference into 
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pathology diminishes our tolerance for and appreciation of the 
diversity of human life’, a resultant dystopian affect which impacts 
all of society (Conrad 2007:148) 
 
 In contrast to my experience in the vignette, I currently see a 
neurologist who attempts to transcend this paradigm. At my latest 
bi-annual review, appointments were running late, as is standard, 
and I was acutely aware of two things: the laminated sign reading ‘if 
you have been waiting for more than an hour, please approach 
reception desk’, and the filtered conversations behind the desk, 
‘we’ve got a hold up in pathology’, ‘neuro registrar’s darted off to ED’, 
‘any word on imaging backup?’, ‘did you hear that woman? No, of 
course we can’t issue medical leave until five if your appointment 
finished at 11’. As the clock ticked over to 11:45, almost two hours 
since I had arrived, I pointedly ignored the laminated directions. 
The stress of the staff was tangible and I recognised the truth in my 
appointment notification: 
  
Every effort will be made to see you at the allocated time however 
individual patients appointment needs may vary. We recommend you 
allow flexibility when planning your day, as your allocated 
appointment time may not be the exact time you are seen.  
 
The neurologist fetched me, a look of harried apology on his face. 
The well-practised yet sincere explanations on his lips quickly gave 
way to his easy friendliness. This neurologist is the one you want for 
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long-term complex care: happy to explain but never ‘dumb down’, 
gentle flaunting of the bureaucratic rules (sessions carry on as long 
as you need to feel comfortable with your treatment, without a hint 
of exasperation), a genuine or well-faked interest in you outside your 
symptoms (‘How’s that thesis going?’ ‘Quit that awful job yet?’), and 
an oddly holistic approach to illness management. We had barely sat 
down when he queried how I was: not medically, but in the same 
way an old friend might after a period of absence. Another in a long 
run of medical students sat with us, the doctor routinely pausing to 
volley medical jargon at her, but more often to fill in narrative 
history. This act resulted in what Radley, Mayberry and Pearce 
(2008) describe as ‘medico-presentational’. My doctor represents our 
consultations as an active narrative event in my illness, and himself 
an actor in it.  
 
This experience offers two points. First, I frame the interaction as 
positive because there is a recognisable sense of authentication in 
being cared for in a humanised way. Authentication is a concept 
repeated here because while my doctor is unable to award me a 
legitimate ‘named illness’, he does grant me it in the social form. 
Authentication, outside of being ‘passage’ to ill status, needs to be 
unpacked in its relationship to living a good life, one composed of 
‘moral acts’ that position illness as an acceptable mode of being. We 
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need to be able to work with medicine to find ‘the assurance that it 
is not totally absurd to have suffered’ (Levinas, quoted in Frank 
2004:141). Second, it demonstrates consolation, what Frank (2004) 
considers a viable solution to the shortcomings of modern medicine: 
the offering of consolation between patient and physician. Conrad 
(2007) asks ‘What are the limits to medicine’s role in reducing 
suffering?’, a question startlingly relevant in this medicalised age 
(156). My interaction is evocative of this reciprocal consolation. My 
doctor offered consolation to me through the recognition of these 
limits. We shared in a paradigm of generosity that humanises both 
our roles, and returns the story to the body and the body to a 
peaceful identity.   
 
There is a pervading sense of failure against which we measure 
experience in the medical world. The failure as patients to get well, 
the failure of medicine to provide cures, the failure of the physician 
to help us. What I respond to in this interaction is Frank’s (2004) 
call for consolation, to ‘render loss more bearable by inviting some 
shift in belief about the point of living a life that includes suffering’ 
(2). We should invite suffering into our lives, instead of denying its 
reality, and decrying its impact. In place of the simplistic narrative 
about hope that is so lauded by cure-oriented medical narratives, we 
as beings inevitably faced with suffering need a medicine that 
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acknowledges and shares in our bodies and our stories. In place of a 
hopeful future we need a present of generosity. In experiencing 
chronic illness, I may have to live in a world where pain is 
interminable, where categorisation is unfeasible, but it could also be 
a world that is connected to me by generosity.  
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CHAPTER TWO: WORK 
You’re wandered all over and finally realised that you never found 
what you were after: how to live. 
      —Marcus Aurelius 
 
 
 
I screw my eyes shut. It is not because of my pain levels, or even the 
unbearable lightness in my bones, the constant threat lying dormant 
in my muscles (do you feel us, do you trust us yet). No, it is because 
of the watchful eye of my audience. I am the unwilling performer in 
a distorted side show, the proverbial freak to marvel over. This is 
not a sentiment expressed through the lips of my observer, but it is 
what I read in their eyes. Show us your trick, they sing silently, 
prove to us your value- make this worth our while. 
Am I worthy? 
I cannot tell. Behind the black-red of my eyelid shield, I am 
hyperaware of my body, the room, the people. I feel hate and shame; 
at my unworthiness; at my vulnerability. At the curve of my 
stomach, pinched over the edge of my jeans. At the tingling of nerves 
in my hip, caught between fat and skin and the uneven surface of 
the rough carpet. At the deadening sensation in my left arm, as my 
weight bears down on it, and the sparking inside me- the warning, 
the prequel of what is to come.  
While all these thoughts and sensations flow through my mind and 
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body, my colleague watches on from a distance, unaware of my silent 
tension. She stands more than a metre from my location on the first 
aid bed, hovering between taking a step closer, and retreating to the 
chair positioned against the far wall. There is genuine concern in 
her eyes, the same concern that held her hand against my shoulder 
as we walked to the room, that sent her around the small space 
seeking out glasses of water and temperature controls, and that is 
now central to the incessant chattering she offers in my direction. I 
have tuned this dialogue out by now, the same contraction of work-
related gossip and suggestions of medical advice that always leads 
with, ‘my cousin’s wife had the exact same thing, and…’ because this 
is the same recycling of communication I hear every time a new 
person witnesses my transformation into Sick Person. Amongst the 
concern for me lies her other, dominant, worries; the eye flicker 
towards the door shows me her desire to not be part of this 
transformation, her own pressures and responsibilities mount up 
between her words, and the low gurgle from her stomach indicates 
that I have interrupted her scheduled lunch break.  
I fight the aggressive anger that wants to shout shut the fuck up, 
can’t you see I’m suffering? and give into the submissive desire to 
still look intelligent and engaged to my superior by answering her 
questions routinely and repetitively. I veer between assuring her my 
work is completed and saved appropriately, with notes for whomever 
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will finish it (oh, we’re not worried about that, our only concern is 
your health says the organisation from the mouthpiece of the 
individual), and patiently explaining that, yes, I have heard of 
hypnotism being used on ‘people like me’, and of course I will 
consider it, right after I get through this iteration of my illness.  
The careful balancing act we have constructed falls down the second 
my leg begins to shake, and her composed face fractures into horror 
as my body arches and falls, contracts and thrusts.    
 
Work Analysis 
I was good at work until I was bad at health.  
Constructing my condition in a workplace is always a challenge. I 
have vacillated from non-disclosure through to systematic 
description involving ‘living documents’, to glib shorthand and 
angry, defensive confrontation. I cannot say which has ‘worked’ the 
most, but each approach has been mediated by the broader 
landscape of my life. My first adult job was at 18, and came seven 
months after the initial onset of my illness. The preceding months 
had been constructed entirely around my physical state- monitoring 
my symptoms, alleviating my pain, recovering from my exhaustion, 
going to check ups and follow ups, awaiting test results, deciding on 
new treatment. As the months wore on, the hectic activity wound 
down, leaving me adrift in the summer months, sleeping and 
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generally not considering any plans for the future. Then, in 
February, my parents politely but pointedly told me to get a job. My 
health was stabilised, we believed, but I was caught in that post-
graduate haze of new adulthood, amplified by the disruptive launch 
from child-at-school to grownup I had experienced primarily through 
medical induction. I do not much remember how I got the job, but I 
found myself employed more or less full-time in a bookshop within 
the month. In my familiar, naive manner, I babbled childishly to my 
new co-workers about my medical experience, chalking it up to a 
one-off viral occurrence. I spoke more of my time in the medical 
world as a form of capital- I had experiences my colleagues did not, 
exciting ones that involved brushes with ‘death’, pain, and entry into 
a community that was restricted to a members-only pass. I was, in 
that tiny bubble community, the privileged survivor of The Sick 
Role.  
 
What I failed to recognise, in my small, selfish youth, was the fact 
that basically everyone else had had equally important events 
happen in their own lives, and in my obsession with discussing 
myself in such a light, I was positioning myself as not only a victim, 
but also minimising its impact on my emotional and mental growth. 
I framed it as a brief aberration in my life trajectory, not a 
significantly traumatising event that I needed to process as a brush 
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with mortality. Kathy Charmaz generalises my experience saying 
that ‘a crisis can be long talked about, but kept contained in time 
and place’ (Charmaz 2000:281). She problematises this framing as 
‘such stories must be carefully constructed lest negative meanings 
from the past seep in… patients may concentrate on past crises and 
thereby avoid dealing with present uncertainty, impaired bodies, 
and changed lives’ (2000:281). Regulating my ‘crisis’ as an acute 
episode meant, as Charmaz predicts, I was unprepared for the 
reoccurrence of my symptoms. In the context of my working self, this 
had several, important, consequences.  
 
Firstly, I had lost the biographical assumption of a ‘working life’- the 
ability to perform material resource collection, limited only by skills, 
capital accumulation and ability. Second, my way of working would 
be forever mediated by the lens of illness- I would have to construct 
my work identity through physicality, emotionality, and complex 
negotiations in employer-employee/teammate-teammate relations.  
A co-worker once likened my workplace participation to a battle, ‘it’s 
like you come in here charging, striking down all foes, before your 
injuries slow you down or cut you out’. He meant that I would start 
each day intensely attempting to complete all my daily tasks, before 
my illness had a chance to stop me. His enthusiasm for historical-
fantasy might have framed his analogy, but he did manage to expose 
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a pattern of behaviour spoken about by many sufferers of chronic 
illness. It is a defensiveness that often permeates all areas of life, 
but focuses in the work paradigm as over-compensation. A ‘well’ 
colleague might be pressured to complete their work in a 8-hour 
shift, and thus structure their day around the usual limits of 
hunger, focus, interest, and ability. Someone living with a chronic 
illness, however, must mediate these concerns with the ever-present 
threat of symptom onset.  
 
A typical workday for me starts when I wake up. I perform a mental 
checklist in bed- what are my pain levels? How do my muscles feel? 
Do I feel weakness in my arms? Am I experiencing any signs of 
symptoms- dizziness, distraction, and aches, mood swings? Next, I 
plan my outfit, but it is not appearance with which I concern myself. 
If it has been several days since a seizure, I like to choose pants, or 
some other restrictive clothing. Otherwise, I dress myself in 
lightweight, moveable clothing- a loose dress, well-worn stockings 
with slouchy waist, flat shoes I can kick off. I used to love heels, but 
between weight gain and increased seizures, I avoid them. If I have 
the energy, I do makeup and hair- more and more a mask for puffy, 
bruised eyes, pallid skin and limp hair, worn out from medication. I 
wonder when clothes stopped being fun ways to express myself and 
merely protective draping for my body. When makeup ceased to be 
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about fun lipstick colours, and instead about painting myself into a 
‘healthy person’ veil. With my false face in place, I am ready to put 
my false persona on. When Hochschild wrote that ‘emotional labour 
is the silent work of evoking and suppressing feeling- in ourselves 
and in others’, she managed to encapsulate the position of the 
chronic illness sufferer in the workplace, but there is a rapid cycling 
between our ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ acting (1993:333-4). In place of the 
consumer in Hochschild’s model are our employers and co-workers, 
and we must sell our emotions continuously to enact the proper 
social model of a worker. The moment when we falter, when we shed 
our healthy skin and slip into the sick role, we cease to be the 
worker.  
Once at work, there is a pattern of back-and-forth role performance, 
worker and sick person, sick person and worker. Perform tasks 
competently; remind others about limitations (‘I’ve finished with 
this, I need a break, I can do that in ten minutes, I can’t stay late 
tonight’). It is a primarily hidden process, held to gratefully by co-
workers who do not wish to disrupt the structural presumptions of 
the ‘morally competent actor’ (Pinder 1995:624). These covert 
processes are the result of ‘the tacit rules of organisational 
behaviour (which) define the working self’ (Sennett 2005:131). We 
hold to these patterns because we still innately see health as good 
and sickness as bad. I have been in situations where I have been 
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informed of changed responsibilities ‘not because of your work, but 
we don’t want to risk your health’. I am the immorally incompetent 
actor, regardless of the acuteness of my illness. This is problematic 
not only in the immediate sense (the biomedical happening of illness 
serves to repeatedly fracture any status quo), but in the deeper 
structure of work-place existence. By bringing chronic illness into 
the workplace, I at the least disrupt the ‘tacit rules’ on an 
unconscious level.  
 
The chronic illness sufferer is responsible for bringing to light the 
transparent phenomena of embodied work. Our bodies cannot be 
regulated to the background of the workspace, but exist in a 
spotlight in the foreground. Taboos are disregarded by self and 
other; I discuss and consciously refer to bodily functions daily, others 
take hold of my body in ways otherwise unacceptable. As indicated 
in the vignette, the boundary between private and public blurs in 
the context of illness. It is a daily occurrence to have someone direct 
my body into their perspective, to claim an ownership of my physical 
existence, and my autonomous decisions. Is it not a normal 
occurrence to offer someone advice, especially if you have experience 
in the topic? Say, your colleague has a cold, and you offer a lemon-
and-honey-tea recipe. This is kind, a sharing of knowledge, and 
concern for another human being. It is also an assumption that they 
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are not capable of caring for themselves, that they are not 
participating in the ‘getting well’ process. It should be redundant to 
say that an employer telling an employee, in the midst of a acute 
episode, that they ought to try this-or-that, is a horrible abuse of 
power, an unfortunate reflection of the moral ‘righteousness’ of the 
healthy over the ill. Yet, such incursions are a daily part of any 
chronically ill person’s life, an attribute of the masked nature of 
embodied work.  
 
In this sort of event, there are two factors at work. In the first, the 
way in which the ‘disruptive event’ mandates a sort of 
marginalisation; resettling a situation is often the expected response 
to disruption, a need to maintain the status quo. Second is how 
responses to contested illness, especially a disruptive one, are more 
overtly stigmatised. The person depicted in my vignette felt 
authorised to comment on my illness management (not only in 
general, but during a seizure) because I am afforded very little 
legitimacy due to the stigmatised nature of my illness. As stigma is 
normalised and embedded in the workplace, each seizure event 
‘increases the susceptibility of a person with epilepsy to further 
stigma—thus setting up a vicious, difficult to interrupt cycle of 
medical and socioeconomic morbidity’ (Fiest et al 2014:443). Any 
attempt to deconstruct workplace behaviours like this would require 
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for one much more structural power than I have had access to, and 
for a second, an articulated awareness of systemic inequality. Such 
an articulation would necessitate a pedagogical overhaul of the 
‘diversity’ programs found in most workplaces.  
 
Work has both tangible and intangible affects, which serve to create 
a participatory experience for the common worker- superannuation, 
housing, capital both financial, and social, stability, social 
connectedness, etc. The less work is an option for an individual, the 
more the deleterious effects of what Little (1998) calls ‘boundedness’ 
become apparent to the chronically ill. Boundedness, described by 
Little as ‘the particular ways in which the world ‘contracts’ for the 
patient, through an awareness of limits to space, available time and 
empowerment’, is a theme easily apparent in the narrative of 
working while ill (1998:1486). In both acute and non-acute phases, 
the chronically ill experience heightened awareness of the limitation 
of working, and begin the ‘surrender of social and working roles’ 
(Little 1998:1488). Time becomes measured in health and illness, 
not days or weeks. Spaces are restricted in new ways- in one 
instance, I was moved from my office team to a separate desk closer 
to the first aid area. Space suddenly highlighted my differentness, 
and limited my working interactions. These forms of hidden 
disability discrimination are spoken of by Little’s patients, and in 
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every anecdotal story I have heard (1998:1488).  
 
Little further expresses the concern in these issues, stating that 
‘limitations of choice and power are particularly important for those 
whose social role is to a significant extent defined by their work’ 
(1998:1489). Work affords meaning to a life, and the sudden, on-
going exclusion of the chronically ill from employment reduces a 
person to less than whole, ‘a life that is diminished’ (Frank 
2013:xvii). This diminishment, contraction, or boundedness, creates 
a new form of suffering that is at once tied up in, and separate to, 
the specifics of chronic illness. When I consider my relation to the 
working world, I feel resentment equally towards my illness and my 
past jobs/employers. I can recognise, as an educated person, how 
complex a situation this is, and acknowledge misplaced blame in my 
reaction. What I cannot reconcile is how this knowledge can assist 
me, and in that disenchantment, what is there is in attempting to 
reconcile it. I find myself incapable of thinking of my future 
stability. When I do, my stress levels rapidly rise, and I fixate on 
these limitations, the manifestations of stigma in the workplace. It 
would seem difficult to resolve this, to stop these stigmas making me 
‘not quite human’ and reinstate myself as acceptable with my illness 
(Goffman 1990:15). 
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Relational interactions in the workplace are only relevant when 
actually employed. The feasibility of working full-time or long term 
with a chronic illness is heavily impacted by type of work, workplace 
support, acute phases, familial support, and individual value 
systems. There is a pervading sense of uncertainty, of living in Little 
et al’s (1998) constant liminal space. Restructuring processes and 
narratives as an individual moves in and out of acute periods of 
illness often means setting career or employment goals to the side, 
by choice or circumstance. The effects of variable employment are 
manifold and long reaching. The affect of employment on recovery or 
increased management of chronic illness is well documented. 
Simpson et al (2013) note statistical increases in its positive affect 
(173), while Brooks et al (2015) points to the benefits of participating 
in socially valued activities. Despite this, chronic illness is mostly 
incompatible within workplace structures. The follow-on effects of 
variable employment reach into superannuation, housing, identity 
and social judgement, and stability. These are not abstract concepts 
for a person living with a chronic illness. I have lost jobs. I have less 
than half the super of my friends. Living outside of home is 
compounded by my inability to safely live alone, the infeasibility of 
renting, and my long-term ability to pay a mortgage. I can hide most 
of these, which affords me successful social ‘performance’ but 
heightens my alienation. It is one of the most stressful sides to my 
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relationship with employment. Ignoring the personal desire to work, 
or social capital it creates, I struggle most with the alienation of 
non-employment. I cannot communicate to even my closest friends 
how not working is an extension of my illness, and not an active 
choice. It separates us from the smallest issues -affording a meal 
out, shared stresses about working life- to the largest -the successful 
adherence to the social model of a ‘good’ person. This separation, 
described by Little (1998) as ‘communicative alienation’, invariably 
means I negotiate a framework other than ‘illness’ to explain my 
employment status. Whatever that framework is, it is a necessary 
misdirection I use to validate my social participation. When we 
recognise that ‘people take for granted that their views reflect the 
true, objective reality, and build ’shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ into them’, 
(Charmaz 2000:279) we can understand why people with illness 
work so hard to ‘explain distress in ways other than a disease 
process’ (Charmaz 2000:282).    
  
The conjoining of work and illness always draw images of 
Dickensian suffering to my mind; a wrecked and coal-dusted body on 
an equally wrecked and coal-dusted street, where even the snow 
falls dirty, and the work day is never over. Perhaps I relate strongly 
to this image because in the narrative of chronic illness, ‘work’ is 
often as unattainable, incomplete, and physically wearing as it is for 
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Oliver Twist or Bob Cratchit. The intrinsic imbalance of power in 
the working structure is exasperated by the way illness is always 
visible to the ill. What I see as I enter a workspace is not what 
others may see. I note the distances from desk to exit to sick room, 
and the strangers seated between them. I do not want to complain 
about this place being too crowded to have a seizure, or that person 
making me uncomfortable during an event (complaining, after all, is 
bad), but, actually, I do want to complain. The body must be 
acknowledged in the structure of work, as moral competency is 
governed by factors not overtly recognised (yet intrinsic to) the 
production of the workplace.  
 
What this all adds up to is constant uncertainty about the future. 
The relationship I have to work is as often about earning money or 
having a ‘purpose’ as it is about ‘proving myself healthy’. Being 
employed, and able to participate fully in my ‘worker’ role lets me 
‘own’ the identity I want to portray. I am responding to a need to 
‘establish a sense of coherence’ against the incoherence of illness. 
(Radley 2002:3). Employment is a critical component in our social 
value-system; not working is deviance, immorality, and acceptable 
exile (Pinder, Clair, Fiest). It is a struggle to express the framework 
of undiagnosed chronic illness in a world set up to deliberately hide 
illness narratives. The specificity of the workplace framework is 
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almost epistemologically incompatible with the inconsistency of 
chronic illness. The stigma of contested illness is manifested in the 
very space of the workplace, and in how access and time are 
mediated through ‘concern’ for health. Being undiagnosed 
essentially acts as a legitimising dismissal of my altered state, I 
cannot be sick if I do not have a name, and if I am not sick- well, 
why aren’t I working?  
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CHAPTER THREE: UNIVERSITY 
 
 
There is no greater agony than bearing an untold story inside you 
—Maya Angelou 
 
 
 
What to do about pain? As I am writing this, I sit twisted on a hard 
chair, upper body supported on forearms against the desk, legs 
curled beneath my torso. I shift regularly, pain from my lower pain 
extending up through my shoulders, and down my upper arms. I 
stretch and pull against tense muscles, rub the stinging tendon in 
my neck. I ignore the light jerking of my fingers, a remnant of 
yesterday’s seizures. Today is what I categorise as a ‘bad day’, as I 
am on my third set of painkillers, and still feel uncomfortable. This 
influences my writing; flicking through reference books, I cannot 
engage with the text. My mind shifts and wanders, jerking back into 
focus as the pain spikes. Perhaps more so than the seizures 
themselves, this situation impacts my ability to perform research. I 
resist the urge to lie my head against the cool desk, and turn back to 
Arthur Frank’s Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness and Ethics. He is 
speaking of dyadic and monadic bodies; the body that experiences 
illness in of itself and in the other, or the body that is alienated and 
separate in its experience. I wonder what my parents experience 
when they see me in pain. I wonder, as Frank does, if ‘cultural 
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perceptions of where medicine places the body on the continuum 
from monadic to dyadic’ mean I exclude them from my pain, if I 
refuse them legitimacy of experiencing the pain alongside me (Frank 
2013:??). This leads me to broader implications. How much of my 
illness is mine, in the sense that I am the one most impacted by it, 
most limited or changed, most hurt by it? Right now, bone-weary, 
resentful, and more than a little angry, I do not want to cede any of 
my illness to others. I do not want to see my pain reflected in their 
eyes, or share in it with them. I want to be alone in it. Yet, illness 
truthfully cannot be experienced alone, and I have never ‘been alone’ 
in it. I have yet to have a relationship of any type that has not been 
impacted or informed by my illness in some way. Constructing my 
condition with my intimate others has from the first instance been 
my most difficult task. Pondering this as I rest the book on my 
hands grows more difficult, in the physical sense. The next line in 
the book fades in and out of focus, and my attention drifts. There is 
a familiar frustration to this. I cannot think of a single essay I have 
written in my university career that has not been impacted by 
illness. A day studying without pain is an oasis (scratch that, a day 
without pain is an oasis) in the unending, terrible desert of chronic 
illness. Today such an oasis is not even a glimmer in the distance. 
My writing is muddied, my thoughts undeveloped, my analysis 
infantile. I stretch my legs out from underneath me, slam the book 
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shut. Standing, I feel a wave of dizziness. As it passes, I gather my 
book and bag, walking slowly outside. There will be no more 
studying today and I wish I hadn’t made the drive to campus. I will 
nap in my car, seat extended almost flat, tinted windows protecting 
me from querying eyes. I will let the flickering shadows of the trees 
lull me away from the pain and the stress, and pass a few hours 
unnoticed among the bustle and movement of university life. When 
the pain fades, I will be a student again. 
 
University Analysis 
 
The dying summer light hits low across the classroom, reflecting off 
the metallic edges of my table. I am correctly answering my tutors’ 
question, but there is a nagging sensation in the back of my head. I 
am staring at the light and not my class as I realise I am about to 
have a seizure. I get up to leave, but my tutor misunderstands, and 
somehow we end up crashing bodily in the middle of the room. I am 
shaking and frantic as I half-shout, ‘Seizure, have to leave’, and bolt 
from the room. A friend from that tutorial later tells me I actually 
seemed calm (and not as insane as I feared), but this does not stop 
the sour acid of embarrassment every time I recall that day. As an 
unplanned breaching experiment, it quite accurately reflects on how 
people react to my illness at university. Empathy, certainly, but 
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pity, fear, disgust, and even irritation, are the predominant 
responses. Chronic illness functions as a border at university, 
separating me into a different category of student. This border 
operates on bureaucratic, academic, and social levels. My 
construction of my ill student identity is challenged and framed by 
two key areas. In the first, the state of my physical and mental 
health acts as a regulator to the limits of my academic participation. 
My body dictates where I move on campus, when I study or attend 
class, how well I can perform assessments, when I complete tasks, or 
how I interact with others. The second lies in the response of others 
to the legitimacy of my illness. To be found ill is one challenge, but 
to be found healthy is equally important. It requires a delicate 
balancing of perceptions, disclosure, and concealment. I must be ‘ill’ 
to disrupt a class, but ‘healthy’ to earn a mark. These are the central 
conflicts of being chronically ill at university. 
 
I first decided to go to university while sitting atop a Scottish cliff, 
being battered by wind and snow. It was a lot less dramatic than it 
sounds, less a ‘eureka’ moment and more ‘well, I was healthy enough 
to climb up here and be ludicrously uncomfortable, I can be 
ludicrously uncomfortable while learning’. I have to admit, that was 
the entirety of my though process, including and all the way though 
my bridging course, testing, and acceptance into my Arts degree. I, 
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like many students, had no idea what I actually wanted to do once 
there, but I felt it could lead to something important. Forensic 
anthropology? I could work for the UN and uncover graves of 
genocide victims. Archaeology? I love history, and playing in the 
dirt. English literature, and write the next Great Australian Novel? 
Or sociology, which had suddenly introduced me to ways of viewing 
the world I had never considered? My transcript after first year 
resembled a sampling menu, and I was floating in excitement over 
the possibilities of the future. Eventually, my health hit another low, 
and I had to make serious decisions about my degree. Could I ever 
really be healthy enough to work as a forensic anthropologist, or any 
high-intensity career? I chose initially to ignore these questions, and 
my health steadily declined, mentally and physically. This head 
burying, as Charmaz (2000) suggests, is typical of chronic illness 
sufferers, especially considering ‘they seldom want to be invalids; 
they want to be accepted as valid adults’ (282). At 21, I desperately 
wanted to be validly adult, to have an adult identity separate to my 
illness. 
 
It is a negotiation of moral discourses that the chronically ill enters 
into with social others. The interrelation of students –the 
competition, the networking, and the support– is underscored by 
emerging moralities of maturity (be they formed by new knowledges 
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found in the classroom or the bar). The microcosm of society found 
on campus brings about moral assumptions of academic behaviour. 
There are varying rules about this morality, as if on a spectrum, and 
the ill person is subject to certain expectations –related to when and 
where our bodies become ill, for how long, and in what way– and 
these expectations, if breached, have complex repercussions. The 
stigmatised body may be intellectualised on campus, but it is far 
from free of cultural taboos. It is not the threat of discovery, nor of 
associated relationship affects, but of academic viability: to be 
essentially accused of ‘cheating’ each time illness alters our 
academic participation. Once, I messaged a friend to say that I had 
received a HD on an assessment in a class we shared. His reply was 
instant- ‘wow, that extra time sure did benefit’. Referring to a week’s 
extension I had received as part of my disability plan –granted 
automatically in times of illness– I was dismayed to think he saw 
my grade as a reflection of ‘bonus’ time, instead of a necessary step 
to reinstate fairness, in light of my health.  
 
Perhaps he was right: if I did not have special consideration, would I 
still have done as well? Would I have done better, or worse? The 
problem with this line of thought is that it assumes a situation that 
did not happen, and could not happen. Yet, it is constantly asked of 
the chronically ill. We are expected to apologise for the moral 
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transgressions of a life we are not capable of living. To be judged by 
co-workers is one thing, but the judgment of academic peers has 
specifically troubling connotations. I naively assumed prior to my 
degree that there would be a greater acceptance of ‘differentness’, 
especially in studying sociology, with classes like ‘health and illness’. 
There is, however, rarely intellectual enlightenment over disability 
culture, even among groups studying it. I was shocked to be told (by 
a person identifying as ’disabled’) that I had no right to claim 
disability status at university, and then immediately ashamed- why 
do I get to chose their definition of disability when they so clearly 
share the same internal struggles I face? Should I not show 
compassion and generosity to those who share in my experiences, 
even if they refuse to grant me access to their authentic states? How 
are we to even consider ways of stepping outside this paradigm? 
Nirmala Erevelles writes of finding ‘no easy way of drawing 
boundaries between who should be in and who should be out’, and 
that is one of the most complex understandings I have reached about 
chronic illness (2014:para 2).  
 
Presuming access to the ersatz title, I am recipient to the legal 
obligations of the Disability Act, and the accompanying support 
services. These rules and regulations, support programs (Access & 
Equity, ETC), etc., are all in service to the declared aims to ‘raise 
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awareness and understanding of disability issues with all students 
and staff (and) enable students with disability to participate fully in 
University life’ (‘Welcome to Access and Equity’ 2015). The intention 
is clear, but what universities lack is a culture of care, or to return 
to Frank (2004), consolation and generosity. When I have a seizure 
in a classroom, I do not want pity, panic, or the peculiarly belittling 
prattle (‘Oh, you poor thing! What should I do, do you know what to 
do now? Should someone call her parents?’). I do not want the 
judgemental reaction, where the normalised routine is to assume my 
infantilism. What I want, and I draw this from Frank, is to be 
allowed to remain fully human in this moment. To see neither 
averted eyes or fixated ones. To not have tears or nervous laughter. 
To, instead –keeping with necessary medical routines– be included 
in the event. I recognise the criticisms of this position, but I would 
consider them to be the product of socially shaped responses to 
illness. I have experienced the non-disruptive seizure, and what I 
see as absent in that situation are what Pierret (2003) conceives as 
central to the stigmatising force: ‘to assess the impact of the social 
structure on the illness experience, the factors (such as ignorance 
and fear) motivating stigmatisation must be analysed; and the effort 
made the better to understand the ‘stigmatisers’ (15). I should like to 
engage with my own stigmatisers and work together to create a new 
narrative in which we can accept each other. Drawn together by our 
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shared status as students, with a commitment to rising above the 
unchallenged stigmas of society, we could work towards a state in 
which my illness need not create isolation, but connection.  
 
Writing on medication: 
Note to future sober self: This was a really bad idea. You’re literally seeing the walls 
move right now. I mean, I’m seeing the walls move, and I kinda wanna dance with 
them (take that out, totally take that out). What did we want to write about? I’ve got 
this hand written note here, but your notes are stupid, ‘write about being on meds 
WHILE ON MEDS’. Super useful. So much help. Self, how did you get a degree?  
I’m laughing so hard right now. I’ve got this paper, (MOST of the paper, I lost at least 
three pages to the floor demons) and the author’s going ‘ they also signal possible 
hegemonies, with economic rents from creative capital ownership appropriated by 
controllers of financial capital, the encroachment of soft power and the loss of unique 
identities in cultural products as ‘global’/western forms dominate.’  
Like, what does this even mean? Why do we write like that? Do people actually read 
this shit? I think even Beckett would laugh at the incomprehensibility of these words. 
Oh, Beckett. How weird is it that I can still quote him, years after that one course, ‘at 
me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, He is sleeping, he knows 
nothing, let him sleep on’. Maybe we should use that somewhere? Oh, this is 
distraction. Let’s regroup, self. Where are we? What have I said?  
Wait, is this the paper I’m meant to read? Where did I get this?  
 
It is however true that these conflicts—between authentic and 
inauthentic status, intent and result, obligation and anticipation—
currently affect every aspect of university life. The body is rarely 
‘brought forth’ in the academic environment, and this often means 
the affects of bodily experience are reduced by virtue of being 
unrecognised. A lecturer once called me into a meeting. He was 
concerned, holding a copy of my disability plan. In response to my 
explanation that I had been experiencing a long period of intense 
seizures, he told me (not without sympathy) that ‘my class isn't 
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designed as a distance course- you would better learn the content if 
you attended the tutorials regularly’. He was completely correct. 
Another once exclaimed ‘what do they expect, that I install an 
elevator for you?’. The governance of student-teacher power 
relations is upset by the construction of chronic illness in the 
bureaucratic system. The system may be in place to support these 
changes, but the cultural and social stigmas remain. This is evident 
when other lecturers have been supportive. They offer alterations. 
They are empathetic without pity lacing their words. They work 
with me. But I am uncomfortable with my experiences. If my work 
environment is mediated through complex moral evaluations, then 
my university career is even more so.  I feel immense discomfort, a 
strong sense of shame, when I reflect upon the alterations of my 
courses, regardless of how they were medically and bureaucratically 
authenticated. These responses are described by Kleinman and 
Seeman (2000) as ‘the link between culturally patterned and 
personally contingent elements of experience as they impose 
themselves on people’s lives’ (235). The reductionist approach to 
understanding illness renders percipient and compassionate 
interpretation of the illness experience impossible.   
 
Writing in pain: 
Half a day ago, I had a seizure. That is just enough time for the medications to wear 
off, and the pain to kick in. I am typing slowly, hunched over, while my right leg 
bounces to an erratic beat. I cannot focus on the screen of my laptop. I want to say 
something smart about this experience, but I cannot think past the pain, cannot 
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process how to- how to, um, something. I should probably lie down now. That lady, 
the one who wrote that book on pain, (fill in the reference later, self) said something 
like ‘pain is disbelief’, and she is certainly right. I don’t believe how much pain I’m in. 
Although I think she was referring to other people’s ‘disbelief’. I’m getting seasick 
staring at this page. But, what’s really hard, is this fog in my head. It slows everything 
down, pushing against thoughts, blocking connection and understanding. I feel stupid, 
so I stupidly test myself. Read two lines from an article, try to interpret:  
  
“neither sick nor healthy, or they are as much healthy as sick; an ambiguous dilemma. 
Taken-for-granted, everyday methods for accomplishing and managing this condition 
– in categories of sickness or healthiness – appear to be breached”  
 
I sound it out, ’Or. They. Are. As. Much. Healthy. As. Sick…’. The words are like 
molasses, slow and sticky, sliding into each other. I have no idea what the sentence is 
saying. I read it again: ‘for 
accomplishingandmanagingthis…..condition….appeartobe…breached’. It is just 
words. No meaning. I am so so stupid. I really don’t want to write this, but there is a 
bubble of hysteria crawling up my throat, and I’m either going to cry or throw things. 
 
To a certain extent cultural assumptions of bordered bodies and the 
pain experience contribute to these conflicts. The effective 
invisibility of bodily experience in any social arena reduces the 
capacity to empathise with pained and altered bodies. This is never 
clearer than in Scarry’s (1985) words:  ‘The events happening within 
the interior of that person’s body may seem to have the remote 
character of some deep subterranean fact, belonging to an invisible 
geography that, however portentous, has no reality because it has 
not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth’ (3). 
Being in pain, or to make broader application, being in an altered 
physicality, is to be constantly in a different world. In an academic 
location, the pained body straddles intellectual, articulated 
assumptions of understanding, and covert reproductions of societal 
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prejudices. The resultant experience is unlike the transparently 
similar working world. To participate inside this heightened 
environment (in which the implicit assumption is that you are 
obliged to develop critical thinking skills) as an ill body, you must 
learn to defend your identity. The outcome of such defence is often 
that the chronically ill person begins creating a testimonial 
narrative, one ‘that seeks to bear witness, or to give voice to, those 
who suffer’ (Kleinman and Seeman 2006:238). These reflexive and 
articulated stories are seen most prominently on campus through 
disability advocacy groups. The central tenant of these groups is 
that negativity-surrounding disability is emblematic of what is 
described as ‘ableist culture’ (see Cherney 2011, Linton 2006). While 
they seek to destabilise the bordered body and monadic pain 
experience, the effect is often that of another border. I struggle to 
connect the many rules of these groups with their objective goals, 
and my lived experience. In one instance, I recall a fight breaking 
out over the creation of ‘safe spaces’ for disabled students. How to 
construct them, where to construct, for whom would access be 
granted? Many long hours devoted to discussions, and the whole 
time I was thinking- ‘but aren’t we ignoring the issue? Shouldn’t 
everywhere be a safe space?’. It is not that my thoughts were ‘better’ 
or more important. Engagement with a bureaucratic model to alter 
systemic assumptions of bodies will inevitably invite in complex and 
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meandering pathways to change. Is my desire to be authentically ill 
outside of these groups problematic? Is their perspective less so? 
Then again, these are not the questions that need asking. We should 
be less concerned with how much than with what sort of help. 
 
Illness narratives in academic settings are moderated by assumed 
and actual modes of acceptance, expressed through conditions of 
authenticity and conflict. We are confronted by discourse hinting at 
better ways of thinking, of knowing, of being, but we as ill bodies as 
still subject to broader societal controls. In the heightened 
atmosphere of universities, the chronically ill are both presented 
with modes of understanding their illnesses –ways that carry certain 
academic legitimacy– and with intense reproductions of the biases 
we will confront in the social world. Disability status allows me 
some authenticity among select groups, not others. The ability to 
utilise critical thinking and academic theory to construct my ill 
identity offers expansive benefits for my future. Conversely, 
university also teaches me the limitations of this type of knowledge. 
The critically absent representation of illness at university is the 
‘somato-moral dimension where the expression of illness’ is 
acknowledged as subjective, as plural, and as malleable (Kleinman 
and Seeman 2006:239). Without these, the ill experience at 
university remains a state of conflict.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
The fix is right in front of us, but we can’t imagine a big change like 
that. We can’t imagine being agents of a change that big. 
—Jacob Clifton, ‘While you were over there’ 
 
 
We are reclining, backs against a tree, legs loped comfortably over 
each other. The water of the lake is hypnotic, and I watch as reeds 
sway slightly in the soft wind. We have not seen each other in three 
months. Busy summers for both of us, but we are in the last month 
of the season, preparing for the new semester and have finally 
caught up. I am comfortable in the silence, content to watch the 
little birds on the grass and smile at the passersby. He speaks 
suddenly, interrupting the peace. Says that he ‘just needed a break- 
not from you, just the constant illness. It was too much, too often. I 
felt like I was forgetting why we were friends, it was all so draining’.  
God, that hurts. Partly the fact that he needed a break, that 
friendship had become burdensome to him, but more acutely that he 
was able to walk away and recover. I wanted that too. To walk away 
from my illness and come back refreshed. I stay silent because if I 
get angry, he might walk away, again. It’s not the first time someone 
has. It’s not even close to the first time, and I sit, trying to count 
how many friendships, relationships, have ended over my illness. No 
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one really says it’s because of the seizures and the mood swings, the 
hospital visits and the medication comedowns, but I know. I see it in 
their eyes, like his eyes right now, wary and not quite making 
contact. He, they, wait to see how I’ll react, if I’ll be normal. I say, 
coolly, that I understand. I make a joke that I don’t hear, and my 
mind goes very, very still as we discuss our summers. I feel intensely 
guilty, for relying too much on him the previous year. For letting 
him (for letting anyone) see too much of ‘sick me’ when I should be 
protecting myself and them from that. I need to change that this 
year, I resolve. I will go to classes and parties, with exit plans that 
don’t involve my friends driving me home. I could put a foam 
mattress on my back car seat, sneak away when I feel a seizure 
coming on. I could do this alone, which is what I want- away from 
the flitting eyes and unspoken words, the repressed annoyance. I 
will do this, and my friends will be happier. I will be happier. Most 
importantly, I will not be repeating this moment with yet another 
friend or boyfriend. I won’t have to watch anyone else walk away.  
He is talking easily now, a story I don’t take in. He invites me to a 
party. It will be two weeks before I will injure my arm during a 
seizure in my car, alone. Not the best plan, and we revert to our old 
status quo. Three weeks later I have a seizure in a shared tutorial, 
and he drives me home, smiling and gently telling me it’s ok, he is 
happy to help, joking about getting him out of class. Months later, 
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we’ll have a screaming match, when I finally get angry that he 
makes me feel guilty for my illness, and our friendship will actually 
be over. When I think of that moment by the lake, I realise all I 
remember is the water and the wind in the reeds, our legs tangled, 
and the quiet warmth of friendship as we sat silently. 
 
Relationships Analysis 
 
There is a line in Jacob Clifton’s While You Were Over There that 
reads ‘Or how far: While you were over there, I am yet still 
entangled’ (2014:80). How entangled we are, with our mothers, our 
fathers, with siblings and friends. These entanglements stretch 
across time and place, bound by memory and convention. 
Friendship, as defined by Tillman-Healy (2003) is ‘an interpersonal 
bond characterised by ongoing communicative management of 
dialectical tensions, such as those between idealisation and 
realisation, affection and instrumentality, and judgement and 
acceptance’ (730). The tension of an undiagnosed chronic illness 
disrupts such management, positioning new (often transparent) 
power imbalances at the centre of all relationships. I have seizures 
that make me physically dependent on others for my wellbeing. As 
discussed in my Work chapter, my financial status makes me 
dependent on family and friends for housing, and other financial 
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needs. I am emotionally dependent on these relationships, to trust 
them with my safety, to keep me sane, in ways that differ from (or 
stretch) culturally normative rules of relationships. These 
imbalances stretch the other way, with dyadic and monadic 
assumptions of bodies and health controlling their participation in 
my illness (see Frank 2013).  The ‘dialectical tensions’ become not a 
give-and-take between equals, but something closer to child-caring. 
It is easy to fall into this paradigm, and hard to slip out. The stress 
of chronic illness on families and friendships is well documented 
(Little 1998, Knafl and Deatrick 1987), the lived experience of 
altered expectation which moves and defines interpersonal bonds.  
 
The central tension to my relationships, with family or friends, is 
the constant threat of suffering. Such ‘suffering occurs…when an 
impending destruction of the person is perceived; it continues until 
the threat of disintegration has passed, or until the integrity of the 
person can be restored in some other manner’ (Eric Cassell, quoted 
in Frank 2013:169). This suffering can be of the body (the act of the 
seizure, the pain, the medication or hospitalisation), or around the 
body (emotional or social suffering between me and them). This 
tension can never fade, integrity never be restored, because the 
illness state is boundless. Everything changes in relationships when 
chronic illness is a factor. The acute periods disrupt and restructure 
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daily motions, but perhaps the most important change is found 
during the non-acute. This is when the disruption of illness fades 
into the background of conscious thought, and the constancy of daily 
life dulls the awareness of ‘chronic’. Here, when the threat of 
suffering is distorted, is the source of most conflict. While I 
constantly experience a ‘heightened and alien state of bodily 
awareness’, those surrounding me do not operate within this same 
state (Charmaz and Rosenfeld 2010:4). Suffering becomes muted 
and invisible, and those on the outside ‘may hear the words but be 
powerless to penetrate the experience’ (Pinder 1995:624).  
 
These hidden illness traits (contested or otherwise) offer a challenge 
to generosity shared among relationships. How often can the non-ill 
respond compassionately to imprecise depictions of pain and 
suffering? How often can the chronically ill, the chronically pained, 
articulate their suffering? When Scarry (1985) writes of pain 
‘belonging to an invisible geography that, however portentous, has 
no reality’, it is an articulation of the chasm between pained and 
non-pained bodies (3). I live in this ‘invisible geography’ for which I 
have no more descriptive words than the non-pained. To converse 
with someone else who see this landscape is to recognise its 
incommunicable truth: no one can know my pain except me, no one 
can know your pain except you. The resulting segregated realities 
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enhance the divide between my lived experience, and my family and 
friends’ understanding of it. It frustrates me to experience the world 
this way: while we sit in this cafe, let’s say, I am with you, but I am 
also in this other place, the one that measures time in pain and 
analgesics and restrictions. Perhaps you also reside simultaneously 
in another world, one as invisible and silent as mine. Perhaps you 
are just as incapable of articulating it as I. Either way, my wounded 
body remains silent in all my relationships, not yet able ‘to give 
voice to an experience that medicine cannot describe’ though those 
dialectic tensions I want so badly to reinstate (Frank 2013:18). Be it 
family or friend, each relationship is held apart: my chronic illness 
sits between us.  
 
My relationship with my family changed forever the day I first had 
seizures. Just 18, I was thrown back into the role of child as we 
passed in and out of medical spaces, learning new languages and 
new ways of being together. I remember being cradled by my 
mother, for the first time in years, remade into an infant as a nurse 
extracted spinal fluid from my lower back. I was in agony and the 
only thing I could cry was ‘mummy, mummy, mummy’. In many 
ways, I have not left that bed, or my mother’s arms, since that day. 
This infant state frames my relationships, every time I seize I 
become beholden to a carer. The weight this brings to a relationship 
	 67	
is not insubstantial. For my family members, it is an added layer to 
the care-giving inherent to the family unit, and an elevation of 
myself above my siblings. Discord and empathy abound in these 
dynamics; as I ‘win’ extra time and energy, yet stagnate in my 
biographical progression, slipping further behind as they race off 
into their futures. It is true that ‘the family undoubtedly represents 
the first line of affective and material support, essential to helping 
the patient cope with disruptions’, but what does it mean for the 
health of those families (Pierret 2003:13)? These relationships 
become fractured, seemingly without hope of repair if the chronic 
illness cannot be ‘cured’. 
 
In the vignette, I purposefully chose to depict a short-term 
friendship (and short-term response) to avoid attempting to unpack 
the complexities of long relationships and chronic illness in short 
narrative form. How do you reconcile the behaviour of family 
members with chronic illness? Is my aunt’s response, for example, 
one born from our lifelong relationship, or her social understandings 
of seizures? When she suggests asking about this new treatment, or 
stares uncertainly when I move past her child, are her responses 
about me, or her? I hesitantly brought this up once, questioning if 
she would only be happy if I were ‘fixed’. I hurt her with those 
words. The same tensions are in place with my every interaction 
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with my parents. When we fight, I am convinced they structure 
everything around how my illness stops me from doing things; they 
are equally convinced this is not true. I think about what a strange 
existence this must be for my little brother, to only know me this 
way. If I say I feel a seizure approaching at the dinner table, he will 
only sometimes stop eating to check if I need help, but is always 
happy to take from my plate. I spend time plotting out text 
messages, projecting an image of self that does not reflect my 
internal state:  
Hi! God, I am SO SORRY, I had seizures, can we reschedule? I am 
the worst.  
Argh, seizures again. So sore. So, so sore. Next time, I’ll just 
organise a truck to run over me, hey? Would you mind if we 
cancelled? 
Can we do my house? I’ll cook! :) Can’t drive right now, is all, 
seizures rahrahrah, but I do have wine… 
Apologetic and humorous, self-effacing and silly, every word is 
carefully selected and structured to fit the right image, one which is 
‘to blame’ yet not at fault. All of these small parts of relationships 
are curated to distract from the real effects of illness and dispel 
burden- upon me and upon them. 
 
These are some of the distinct patterns and behaviours located 
temporally in every relationship in which I participate. The initial 
building of an interpersonal bond is irreducibly based upon 
disclosure: when do I disclose, how do I disclose? Pierret (2003) 
observes that ‘the disclosure of epilepsy might be made to ‘close 
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friends’ and future spouses in carefully thought-out and staged 
circumstances, such as during trips or long moments spent with 
friends (12). The issue here is always, ‘but what if I disclose 
unintentionally’? Seizure-illness is only ‘hidden’, the sufferers only 
‘pass’, until the moment of incapacity. Then you are violently, 
forcefully, made sick, making managed disclosure a tenuous, fragile 
claim to autonomic power. I tend to the up-front divulgence. Not 
quite ‘Hi, I’m Giv, I have seizures, please don’t panic or put a spoon 
in my mouth’, but very near to it. The next step of disclosure is 
harder- when I say that my seizures are ‘atypical’ or so forth, I am 
met with resistance. ‘You don’t lose consciousness?’, they ask 
sceptically. There is little social recognition, even today, of the 
umbrella-term nature of seizures, of focal, generalised, unknown, 
absent, tonic-clonic, myoclonic. We expect to see the dramatic, and if 
our expectations are not met, ‘we can apparently handle the 
differentness of others so long as it is fairly obvious and does not 
catch us entirely by surprise’ (Iphofen 1990:458). Relationships 
begin and end with my illness, it is hard to consider structuring 
anything a relationship if I have not disclosed; it is fundamentally 
impossible to understand a relationship without first considering my 
illness.  
 
Disclosure might seem to be the most vulnerable step in a 
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relationship, but it is far out-weighed by the relentless, effacing, 
never-ceasing period of justification. Familiarity breeds not just 
contempt, but contemptuous habituation. At some point in the 
chronic illness trajectory, every body (including the ill person) will 
become compassion fatigued. There are streams of disconnect and 
resentment, my little brother says ‘oh, that’s just what Giv does’, my 
sister sometimes spits ‘I can’t help it if you’re sick again’. These 
moments pass in and out of on-going relationships, building up then 
dissipating in relation to each own circumstance. And then there is 
the person who remains (it seems) wilfully ignorant, questioning 
over and over again ‘just what’s wrong with you?’. This is the person 
who most struggles with the invisibility of pain, of illness that does 
not fit into socially prescribed boxes. They ask me, ‘aren’t the doctors 
going to do something?’, or my personal favourite, ‘have you tried 
*inset alternative medical practise here*?’. In my ‘on’ moments, ill 
health is forgotten, and the tone changes, ‘are you considering going 
back to work?’. It does not matter when I patiently explain my 
medical management plan, or tearfully inform them of my physical 
pain, or angrily point out I have somewhat of an investment in my 
own self, thank you very much. What matters are the cultural 
dialogue of health and illness accounts that ‘articulate a person's 
situation in the world and, indeed, articulate that world, in which 
the individual will be held accountable to others’ (Radley and Billig 
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1996:221). My health account fails to connect to their own accounts; 
indeed the stories are so incompatible as to be considered entirely 
different genres of discussion. My attempts at constructing ‘valid’ 
accounts for these people are stymied by uncertainty in my own 
illness beliefs, and threatened by, as Frank writes, the ‘chaos…in 
the claustrophobia of confronting others’ inability to see what I so 
clearly felt’ (2013:xv). I want to relieve them of these burdens, but I 
also want the right to live my story, ill or otherwise. 
 
In the account construction, there is an element of resentment, of 
anger at the experience of the other in my body. I do not want to 
participate in the response of others to my body, it generates 
immediate emotions of anger, frustration, even rage. This reaction is 
the monadic body, taught to hold itself alone, to know itself as 
‘existentially separate’ (Frank 2013:36). The opposite state, the 
dyadic body, as Frank (2013) continues, 
 
Represents an ethical choice to place oneself in a different 
relationship to others. This choice is to be a body for other 
bodies. Living for others means placing one’s self and body 
within the “community of pain” to render Schweitzer’s phrase 
contemporary. (37)  
 
To be capable of becoming a dyadic body requires a fundamental, 
ethical shift in my understanding of my illness and its connection to 
my relationships. Part of writing this thesis, this chapter, is to edge 
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towards an active and evolving reality wherein I participate in my 
illness with others. Can I learn to cease being the ‘domineering body’ 
that ‘displays rage against the contingency (of illness) onto other 
people’ and allow family and friends in (Frank 2013:47)? It is 
problematic to consider as the body exists in reciprocal motions with 
the other: my changing self cannot happen without equal change in 
those others. What is crucial here is recognition of the other in 
constructing my illness. I have heard family members and close 
friends describing my illness, ‘She starts to shake, but first there’s a 
bit of vagueness or anger, and then she drops. Her whole body 
shakes, it’s like, it’s- you know, a seizure. Her arms and her back. 
And you have to see it’ ‘Well, Giverney had one of her turns the other 
day’. These words anger me. Their language is not my language, not 
my experience. I do not have ‘turns’, a term that brings to my mind a 
meaning that is not relevant to my experience of my body. Yet this is 
their experience. There are exceptions, like my best friend, who has 
more than once slept on strange, plastic chairs in hospital rooms, 
and unfailingly refuses to differentiate between healthy-me and ill-
me (with both grace and a sense of gallows humour that might read 
cruel to outsiders). She is few and far between, however, and I 
wonder how I would respond if these many interactions broke free of 
the cyclical nature of relationship performance. 
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These interactions are characterised by justification and 
authentication processes, irresolvable and limiting to everyone 
involved. Dependency is a source of conflict in most interpersonal 
bonds, a debate conscious and unconscious for balance. The stress of 
over-dependence of the chronically ill on their close friends and 
families is well established as negative, encompassing, and constant 
(Iphofen 1990, Frank 2004, Pinder 1995). In hoping for removal of 
the ‘domineering body’ I am seeking a continuity of relationship 
performance and of relieving dependence- as Charmaz (2000) 
recognises, ‘maintaining control over life derives from concrete daily 
actions and regaining continuity and coherence of self and one’s 
world’ (280). What Frank (2013) suggests is the ‘communicative 
body’, a body which when it ‘associates with its own contingency 
turns outward in dyadic relatedness, it sees reflections of its own 
suffering in the bodies of others’ (49). In adopting the communicative 
body, the chronically ill are better able to engage with relationships. 
We can share our story and see it reflected back in their stories, 
much like standing in a hall of mirrors. It is quite simply a way of 
bringing back a kindness lacking in modern relationships; a way to 
acknowledge pain and differentness without reduction or burden. 
Becoming a communicative body involves accepting illness as part of 
the human experience. It recognises illness as complex, as separate 
to being immoral, and as being situational- as much as health.  
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Yet, while they are ‘over there’ we are still entangled. No matter 
how separate my experiences are to theirs, we still move through 
recognisable frameworks of friendship and society together. It may 
be an imbued response to cling to the self as ‘we confront the fear of 
dying, of pain, of decline and degradation, and the dread of the 
nothing into which we apparently go’ (Little 1998:1491). Guilt may 
war with anger in the dialectic tensions between my relationships, 
and myself but I am still a part of a social group that more or less 
supports me. The constant state of conflict, within my body and 
surrounding it is exhausting: I want to acknowledge the privilege of 
my situation, but am brought down by the inexorable effacement of 
each day. I am bone-weary facing my interpersonal bonds. The mere 
thought of romantic attachment causes my mind to shy away. I look 
at my family and close friends, at my academic commitments and 
work life, and think even this is too much effort. Yet while there is 
resentment, there is underlying hope- hope that by engaging in 
stories I am reimagining the context of the illness experience. That 
by bearing witness to my own ill narrative, I am setting forth on a 
path towards a life lived better with illness. And that in this 
emerging path, I am able to meet those others I share my life with, 
and share my narrative better with them. The act of engaging in any 
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type of relationship while living with a chronic illness is invariably 
fraught with imbalanced tensions. It may be that a reimagining of 
self, story, and body could open up new ways of being together.  
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Conclusion 
 
We all dress ourselves in stories. Then you start to spill, and for a 
little while afterwards you don’t know what you’re really saying 
anymore. And finally, the thing that is most shocking about spilling 
is you yourself. 
—Pasi Ilmari Jaaskelainen, “The Black Rabbit Literature 
Society” 
 
Sometimes I wake from sleep and wonder who I am. There is the me 
inside my mind, and the me I see in others faces, the me who 
stretches out on strange ground and shakes herself incorporeal, and 
the me who watches all her other selves fracturing and resetting, 
over and over. I wonder if I would think this way if I did not have a 
chronic illness, or if everyone feels this way, or if I was healthy, 
would I only know one me? I divided this thesis into four parts not 
just for ease of analysis, but because I construct my illness so 
differently in each sphere. It is an angry and rigidly structured 
condition in my work life. I am more uncertain and fragile about it 
at university. My relationships flow backwards and forwards 
through changing lenses of illness and health, dialectics of 
responsibility and consideration. I am constantly liminal in the 
medical space, not quite ‘here nor there’.  Sometimes I feel as though 
my entire world is constructed around my illness, operating as the 
central force in my life. There is a sense that there is no me without 
illness, as one of William’s (1984) interviewees put it ‘where have I 
got to? There’s nothing of me left’ (88). I am constantly waiting for 
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the next disruption. 
 
Chronic illness defies description. It is a state of being that is too 
heterogeneous and too readily disguised for definition. It is at its 
heart chaotic. When Bury (1982) states ‘chronic illness involves a 
recognition of the worlds of pain and suffering, possibly even of 
death’, he evokes a meaning that resonates perfectly with my lived 
experience (169).  To be chronically ill is to be constantly aware, of 
our selves, of our bodies, of living in ‘an altered situation’ from which 
you cannot emerge (Bury 1984:170). What is lacking in this 
awareness is a sense of understanding or of stability. We the 
chronically ill are transformed into fractured bodies and minds, 
disrupted biographies, and problematic others. In describing my own 
story, I hope to have connected with other chronically ill persons 
stories, to have helped in some small way to achieve Frank’s desire 
‘to shift the dominant cultural conception of illness away from 
passivity ––the ill person as “victim of” disease and then recipient of 
care––toward activity’ (2013:xix). Compounding any degree of 
success is the chaos of non-diagnosis, of living in liminal spaces, of 
being eternally disrupted. To exist permanently in these spaces 
renders comprehension of ability quite low: it is not a fragile ego 
that displaces confidence but a entrenched condition of unfastened 
reality. What is true of my illness construction today will be 
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plausibly untrue tomorrow. There is no constancy, and therefore no 
measurement for success. Additionally, what may be true for my 
experience may be foreign to another. The other day, a customer 
stopped me in my parents’ cafe. ‘Your mother told my colleague 
about your thesis topic’ she announced, eyes bright as she lightly 
touched my wrist. ‘I just wanted to say, it’s such a good choice- I was 
undiagnosed for 10 years, I have arthritis. I know what it’s like’. She 
wanted to read my finished copy, but I demurred, claiming it too 
unfinished to share just yet. She did not let up, reminding me again 
the next time I saw her, ‘I’d just love to read your work’. I am afraid 
to share it with her, because what if my story does not match hers? 
Will ‘my’ people, other sufferers of chronic illnesses that struggled to 
gain acceptance, reject me? Or worse, what if my words trigger 
something in her that she has not dealt with? I think it is my own 
insecurities about my writing, about my illness, that precipitate 
these thoughts, but I have not brought it up with her again.  
 
Writing this autoethnography of my illness offered an unusual 
opportunity to witness—via analytic reflection of biographical 
experience—my own story-becoming progress. The events I recalled 
as central to my illness, and the ones I found myself incapable of 
writing about, drew forth themes I expected—liminality, 
biographical disruption, variable alienation—and ones I did not: 
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acute loneliness and rigid self-segregation, familial tension, and how 
acceptance of my ill-self causes the most conflict. Drawing lines 
between aspects of my life brought forth what I have come to realise 
is an autoethnographic illness narrative. Incorporating the very real 
need ‘to avoid (the) dehumanisation – of clinician, researcher, or 
patient – that comes from treating those who suffer as if they have 
nothing to say of any relevance to their own lived context’ with the 
tenants of illness narratives and analytic autoethnography to create 
a story (Kleinman and Seeman 2000:239). My analysis sought both 
to find the meaning in my own life, and to join in the ‘web of all 
stories’ (Frank 2013:220).   
 
A curious artefact of this analysis is my own recognition of where I 
place my body in my illness. I do not, as Kelly and Field (1996) 
suggest, consider the ‘management of physical problems’ the 
epicentre of my experience (247). In fact, I vehemently disagree with 
their statement that ‘coping with the physical body has to precede 
coping with relationships, with disruptions and indeed with any 
social reconstruction of events’ (Kelly and Field 1996:247). The body 
is central, always, but the chronically ill body becomes normalised in 
its own way; it is ‘social reconstruction’ which is constant and 
requiring primary focus. Perhaps this is because of social reluctance 
to notice the body, a refusal to ‘bring forth’ the body and thus lessen 
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its social ramifications (the disruptions and breaches, the unclean 
and immoral). But it is not ‘eating, bathing, or going to the toilet’ 
which take central importance in daily life, but the reactions and 
responses to differing physical ability (Kelly and Field 1996:247). 
The chronic illness sufferer learns how to cope, ‘perhaps best seen as 
a cognitive process whereby the individual learns how to tolerate or 
put up with the effects of chronic illness’ (Williams 2000:44). It is not 
the personal struggle of pain or disruption or seizure that construct 
my life. It is the limitations of sharing in those bodily and mental 
experiences with others. 
 
Primary to the construction of these limitations is my inclusion in 
the medical world. To become and remain ill is both requirement of 
the chronic illness experience, and failure of the social self. We are 
punished by the cultural paradigms framing medicine that refuse ill 
health as an authentic way of being. To be chronically ill with a 
disputed illness pushes authenticity further away. Seeking to rectify 
this, Kleinman and Seeman (2000) call for a illness narrative to 
‘improve the quality of care’ (239). Frank (2004) sees resolution in 
generosity and wants from us a simple maxim: ‘To be generous, first 
feel grateful’ (142). In any of these research papers which seek to 
bring into focus the ill experience, I see what I have voicelessly 
called for: someone saying I am grateful for your story. Medical 
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professionals share their stories with me when they impart their 
knowledge and advice, their consolation and empathy. I should like 
to hear that generosity, and in turn show them my gratitude, 
through my story and my consolation.  
 
I touched on the way chronic illness is consumed by the day-to-day 
of life, and the dialectic tensions produced by this state of being in 
‘Relationships’. When Little (1998) acknowledges that ‘there is little 
wonder that the experience of liminality is so unsettling, nor that 
families and friendships are so important and so deeply challenged 
by liminality’, he touches a profoundly raw element of the chronic 
illness experience (1491). Everyone is drawn into the chronic illness 
experience. In this way, all impacted are forced to negotiate the 
liminality of the illness experience, an enduring state of being which 
constructs and reconstructs their own narratives (Little 1998). It is 
impossible to untangle the threads of experience as it forms, and 
informs, the narratives of everyone involved in ‘illness’, to measure 
the extent of how ‘illness is not bounded by the bodies or 
consciousness of those who are ill’ (Kleinman and Seeman 2000:231, 
original emphasis). This in turn pushes monadic and dyadic bodily 
assumptions into the foreground of lived experience, creating 
tensions between the ill body and its associates. The predominant 
question here is one of ethics- ‘who has a right to my body?’. If it 
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were simply the case of receiving medical treatments –which are 
themselves outcomes of monadic assumptions– then there would be 
clear ethical pathways for a decision. However, to include conditions 
of a ‘good life’ muddles the delineation of ethical expectation. Our 
lives involve other bodies, to which we have access and which in 
turn have access to ours. A good life need acknowledge that illness 
does not happen in isolation. We are all affected by illness, and we 
will all remain in those liminal spaces until ill health is brought 
forth.  
 
The bringing forth of ill health is problematic to conceptualise in the 
real world. The nature of the workplace is a pertinent example. The 
ill person in a working environment undertakes a specific set of 
moral quests: to engage with work, to lessen the impact of illness on 
others, and to ‘act well’. Few working environments are capable of 
providing an alteration because the central premise of labour has no 
position for the actual body. Successful integration of ill persons into 
working environments requires a shift in thinking about labour. It is 
easy to fixate on surface level rejections of such change, like 
incompatible physicality for a job, or fiscal expenditure for altered 
equipment. Much like previous arguments against women in the 
workforce, these arguments are arbitrary and inconstant. Yet, they 
remain as vocalisations of entrenched moral conceptions, 
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highlighting ‘anxieties about maintaining existing body boundaries 
and body purity’ which govern rightful access to worker roles 
(Pinder 1995:624-625). As a chronically ill person in the workplace, I 
have repeatedly faced these anxieties and the discriminations they 
bring about. We who are ill are left without appropriate dialogues 
with which to frame these experiences. Illness is made invisible to 
whatever cost, producing tensions the ill can rarely articulate as 
discriminatory. Our limitations become moral transgressions, and 
our access to workplaces becomes fractured.   
 
Likewise, in negotiating access to university (from academic and 
social standpoints), the ill person must navigate prior assumptions 
of ability and constant threat of moral misstep. To be found a 
competent and viable student, I have at times rejected or repressed 
my ill self, to mine and others’ detriment. I have highlighted and 
fixated upon my illness, and received ostracism and vilification. It 
would be a jejune conclusion to lay blame at any specific 
circumstance here. Rather, the academic environment draws its 
discomfiture with illness from its own, awkward juxtaposition as 
both learning centre and labour workforce. Students are presented 
with new modes of knowledges just as quickly as they are trained 
into specific social roles; approaches to and understandings of illness 
are necessarily shaped just as quickly. My personal experience of 
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being ill on campus has been about straddling the intellectual and 
labour roles. The inherent conflict in this situation may be 
irresolvable if we do not consider the broader social paradigms: 
illness will remain an inauthentic excuse for differentiation while 
society believes it so, while definitions of normality mean ‘we are no 
longer in a mood where normal means average; we are in an era of 
amelioration, enhancement, and progress through increasing 
intervention into the ‘mistakes’ of nature’ (Lock 2000:273).  
 
I remember reading Emmanuelle Labroit’s ‘Selections from The Cry 
of the Gull’ as she speaks of discovering her ‘I’ after learning sign 
language, and her joy of self-identity, ‘I had discovered the world 
around me, and myself in the midst of it’ (Labroit 2006:433). She, 
born with a condition that set her apart, alienated by cultural and 
medical practises, had to wait until age 7 to discover her own 
identity. I, on the other hand, was inducted into the normlessness of 
disability at 18. I reflected on her joy, and contrasted it with how 
painful her existence must have been up until that point. In reading 
her words, I felt a degree of recognition that confused me. I shared 
her experience in no meaningful way, and yet I was drawn to her. 
What I had realised is that I do not remember a time before I was a 
patient. I do not remember not being ill. I know, objectively, that I 
was not ‘ill’ prior to being 18, but those past memories are viewed 
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through present lenses. They seem as though belonging to a 
different self. I have wrested every sentence from the chaotic heart 
of my illness experience, onto paper, and assembled something I did 
not expect: the same world Labroit so joyfully received. My illness –
however much maligned, however much feared, in so many ways 
desired gone– is a part of my identity. It is no more possible to 
assemble a ‘healthy’ identity than it would be to consider myself 
male, or a duck, or a tree.  
 
The act of looking at the lived experience of chronic illness, through 
the lens of autoethnography and illness narrative, ought to produce 
descriptive and illuminating text situated inside the perspective of 
the chronically ill. The value of such research is that the resultant 
text highlights both what the chronically ill consciously consider 
important, and the unconscious lapses in their narrative. The 
themes that I privilege in my narrative are ones I consciously 
consider important, yet those absent tell their own tale. There is an 
undercurrent of sadness, even with acceptance. I did not speak of my 
failed relationships, or the weight of illness upon them. I did speak 
of my inability to speak authoritatively to physicians, but not of 
yelling at them. I had to reflect on these absences to recognise them. 
Our stories—our memories—are always chaotic and fragmented, 
even without chronic illness. We assemble truths from thoughts 
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made hazy by time, by recollections distorted by emotion and 
interpretation. We call up memory gifted to us by those we share our 
stories with: mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, friends and 
foes. Our experiences do not happen in isolation, but in constant 
movement with our pasts, presents, and futures. We do not 
naturally assemble our life stories into analysis and identify themes- 
but we do tell stories. The stories I have constructed and written 
down here were consciously chosen, but revealed things I had not 
planned. The sadness, loneliness, and anger were things I thought 
belonging to other chronically ill persons. Belonging, as it were, to 
other stories not a part of mine. 
 
I opened this thesis with a quote from the British author Terry 
Pratchett: ‘If you don’t turn your life into a story, you just become 
part of someone else’s story’. His words were particularly apt, for a 
man who would be diagnosed with early-onset Alzheimer’s, yet 
whose vocation was imagining stories. They were equally apt for me, 
because they highlight the very real need to be become more than 
just a statistic in a medical journal, or a Medicare number claiming 
benefits, or the anecdotal ‘I had a friend who…’. Illness deserves a 
platform to be a credible story, and not simply in the victim 
narrative that so proliferates biographies in bargain bookstores. 
There is a need to sociologically examine the role of illness, of ill 
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health, of chronic illness, of suffering, as stories that benefit our 
understanding of the world. The value of stories, of why we write for 
each other, is so ingrained in the cultural psyche that it has become 
the very fabric of connection to other experiences, and in that 
‘everything that is said carries the resonance of previous stories, 
because every indignation and aspiration, every expression of 
despair and act of courage has been told before’ (Frank 2013:220). 
We use stories to see into the past, to be connected to our present, to 
live beyond our deaths, and to invite others into our bodies and step 
into theirs. Stories become ‘about witness and testimony, as 
wounded storytellers seek to provide different imaginative 
conceptions of illness’ (Frank 2013:187). We can seek—as I have 
sought here—to highlight illness conceptions, and imagine different 
ones. Our identities are tied up in and made up of stories. We can 
and should use these stories to write illness narratives, to be Frank’s 
wounded storyteller. In doing so, we open up the possibility to 
sustain hopeful imaginations, to extend generosity to others, to 
bring forth a need for an ethics of illness. Most importantly, we need 
to offer to others the same courage and hope I found in Arthur 
Frank’s (2013) questions: ‘What story do you wish to tell of yourself? 
How will you shape your illness, and yourself, in the stories you tell 
of it?’ (159). 
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To this end, I have shaped my illness and my story the way I have 
needed it to be shaped. Without holding back negative analysis, but 
without deliberate hurtfulness. Without victimising myself, but not 
without self-empathy. It is not the story I expected. It is not a story 
that is finished, but it is my illness, constructed and deconstructed.   
I play a game. I flex my hand and think, this is my hand. This is my 
leg. This is my arm. I move through my body, reclaiming it as 
inherent and interconnected, as part of the me who choses when to 
move, how to feel. The game ends, and I am short of breath. My eyes 
sting. I stare at my left hand, the one I write with, paint with, and 
draw with. It is still, hanging in the air, foreign and familiar. I 
wonder when it will pass from me to ill. I watch it some more. It 
remains still.    
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